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Abstract: Corruption usually harms all aspects of macroeconomic performances of all countries around the 
World especially the developing world. The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the impact of 
corruption on inflation tax in MENA countries. In a previous paper1, we used Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) as a definition of corruption and applied Friedman, International Bank and Vito Tanzi definitions for 
inflation tax. We concluded that, there is a positive and significant relationship between corruption and 
inflation tax. In this paper, we used two different indices for corruption; Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
and Control of Corruption Index (CCI) to investigate the sensitivity to different definition of corruption. To do 
so, we have concentrated on a sample of 17 developing countries from Middle East and North Africa countries 
for which the necessary data were available for the period 2003-2008. We have used two different indices for 
corruption; Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Control of Corruption Index (CCI). Our findings based on 
panel data (we used unbalanced panel data because of missing data) regression models indicate that in 
general a positive relationship between corruption and inflation tax exists. In other words, the higher is the 
corruption the higher will be the inflation tax. Therefore, according to the results, governments have to try to 
use policies reducing corruption. 
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1. Introduction and Literature 
 
 In recent years, and especially in the 1990s, a phenomenon broadly referred to as corruption has attracted a 
great deal of attention. In countries developed and developing, large or small, market-oriented or otherwise, 
governments have fallen because of accusations of corruption, prominent politicians (including president of 
countries and prime ministers) have lost their official positions, and, in some cases, whole political classes 
have been replaced. Corruption is not a new phenomenon. Two thousand years ago, Kautilya, the Corruption, 
defined as the misuse of public office for private gain, has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years. 
Many international and regional organizations now regard corruption as major obstacles to good policy 
making. The ways in which corruption can manifest and impact on the economy are many and varied, and it is 
important to understand the range and diversity of the mechanisms involved. In this paper we present a 
theoretical and empirical analysis of a mechanism that relates to considerations. The general relationship 
between corruption and inflation tax has been identified in some empirical studies indirectly (Blackburn, 
Neanidis and Haque, 2009). These and other investigations (including theoretical work) also provide insight 
into the many channels through which corruption might take effect.  
 
A non-exhaustive list of these is the following: corruption may cause a misallocation of talent and skills away 
from productive (entrepreneurial) activities (Acemoglu, 1995) corruption may undermine  the protection of 
the property rights, create obstacles to doing business and impede innovation and technological transfer 
(Hall and Jones, 1999; North, 1990) corruption may cause firms to expand less rapidly, to adopt inefficient 
technologies and to shift their operations to the informal sector (Svensson, 2005) corruption may limit the 
extent of a country’ trade openness and reduce inflows of foreign investment (Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004; 
Wei, 2000); corruption may lead to costly concealment  and detection of illegal income, resulting in a 
deadweight loss of resources (Blackburn et al. 2006; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2007); corruption may 
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compromise human development through a deterioration in the scale and quality of public health  and 
education programs (Blackburn and Sarmah, 2008; Gupta et al. 2000; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005) and 
corruption may cause a general misallocation of public expenditures as certain areas of spending (military 
spending) are targeted more for their capacity to generate bribes than their potential to improve living 
standards (Gupta et al. 2001; Mauro, 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). 
 
 In terms of public finances, corruption may impact independently on both the expenditure and revenue sides 
of the government′ s budget: for any given state of the latter, corruption can distort the composition of 
expenditures in ways described above; for any given state of the former, corruption can alter the manner by 
which revenues must be generated, as suggested by other empirical evidence. Thus Ghura (1998), Imam and 
Jacobs (2007) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997, 2000) conclude that corruption reduces total tax revenues by 
reducing the revenues from almost all taxable sources (including incomes, profits, property, capital gains and 
goods and services.) The implication is that, ceteris paribus, other means of raising income must be sought, 
and one of the most tempting of these is seigniorage. Significantly, it has been found that inflation (a likely 
consequence of seignior age) is positively related to the incidence of corruption (Al-Marhubi 2000). It is these 
observations that provide the motivation for this paper which seek to analyze in detail the influence of 
corruption on the composition of government revenues and government's expenditures, especially non-
productive government expenditures, and the implications of this for inflation tax.  
 
The theory of optimal taxation (Phelps, 1973) contends that the government tries to equate the marginal cost 
of inflation tax with the marginal cost of output taxes in order to minimize the distortions of taxation. 
Therefore, the government may choose to use seignior age as a way to finance public expenditures and 
budget deficit. When there is possible for the government to use seignior age to finance government 
expenditures and budget deficit, it is easier to increase government expenditures compared with the situation 
that government has to raise taxes to finance government expenditures. Governments, especially in 
developing countries, try to obtain revenue from printing money by creating inflation as a way to finance 
budget deficit. Inflation and money supply growth are higher when central banks are less independent 
(Alesina and Summers, 1997). Alesina and Perotti (1995) discuss the political economy of budget deficit. 
Fischer et al. (2002) discuss the effect of budget deficit, seignior age and some other determinants of modern 
hyper and high inflations. Although seignior age can explain the high rates of inflations in many developing 
countries, but it does not analyze the underlying forces that are behind budget deficit and inflation while they 
are not socially favorable. Corruption provides the economics of budget deficit through increasing 
government expenditure especially non-productive government expenditure. 
 
2. Model, Data, and Estimation Methodology 
 
We study the case of 17 developing countries (MENA) and use annual data for the 2003- 2008. The time 
period and frequently is largely dictated by the availability of data. Data on  is the ratio of inflation tax to 
GDP (percent).  is the ratio of foreign trade ( export plus import to GDP).  is GDP per capita and  
is the inflation that all of them are from WDI1. We have also used two different indices for corruption; the first 
one is Corruption Perception Index (CPI) that is an e-index based on 17 different types of votes by 10 
organizations that are from transparency international organization; and the second one is Control of 
Corruption Index (CCI) that oriented from WGI2. Corruption Perception Index range is between zero and 10 
that zero shows the maximum amount of corruption and 10 shows the minimum amount of corruption in the 
country; because of this contradiction, we minus all of the scores from 10 , so the higher scores represent the 
maximum amount of corruption and the lower scores show the minimum amount of corruption. Control of 
Corruption Index range is between -2.5 and 2.5 that higher scores represent an economy with more control of 
corruption and lower scores show an economy with less control of corruption. The basic model is estimated 
on panel data for 17 developing countries from Middle East and North Africa and the sample period is 2003- 
2008. 
 = + + )+ + + + +  
                                                             
1-World Development Indicators. 
2-World Governance Indicators. 
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Where; 
  = time. 
 = country. 
 = ratio of inflation tax to GDP. 
 = ratio of foreign trade to GDP. 
 = GDP per capita. 
 = corruption index. 
 = inflation. 
 = ratio of inflation tax to GDP with one lag. 
 = dummy variable. 
, ,…,  are parameters in the model and  is error term. 
 
3. Results and Discussion  
 
First, we use Levin, Lin, Chu unit root test to test the stationary for variables. The results, as represent in table 
1, show that all of the variables are station. 
 
Table 1: The results related to stationary test for dependent variable. 
Variable Statistic test Unit root test result 
1 -13.97 stable 
2 -6.43 stable 
3 -5.88 stable 
Source: Researcher calculations using Eviews 6. 
 
Table 2: The results related to stationary test for independent variables. 
Variable Statistic test Unit root test result 
) -1.6 stable 
 
-4.2 stable 
 
-3.2 stable 
 
-3.1 stable 
 
-3.7 stable 
4 -12.7 stable 
5 -5.1 stable 
6 -7.9 stable 
Source: Researcher calculations using Eviews 6. 
 
Second, we test heterogeneous between units by F-statistic. If null hypothesis is not accepted, we use panel 
data. Null hypothesis is: 
 
 
 
                                                             
1- Ratio of inflation tax to GDP (Friedman definition). 
2- Ratio of inflation tax to GDP (International Bank definition). 
3- Ratio of inflation tax to GDP (Vitotanzi definition). 
4- Ratio of inflation tax to GDP with one lag (Friedman definition). 
5- Ratio of inflation tax to GDP with one lag (International Bank definition). 
6- Ratio of inflation tax to GDP with one lag (Vitotanzi definition). 
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 = Restrict Residual Sum Squares. 
 = Unrestricted Residual Sum Squares. 
 = number of units. 
 = number of parameters. 
Then for choice between Fixed Effect (F.E) and Random Effect (R.E) models we used Hausman Test: 
)   
Where   = number of parameters, =covariance matrix for coefficient of F.E model . 
 
In Hausman test null hypothesis show Fixed Effect. In according above test, as shows in table 1, we run some 
of the regressions with Random Effect test and some of them with Fixed Effect test. 
 
Tabel3: Model’s regression findings 
Variable Equation 
(1) 
Equation 
(2) 
Equation 
(3) 
Equation 
(4) 
Equation 
(5) 
Equation 
(6) 
C .00017 
(.46) 
***-.22 
(-3.4) 
.01 
(1.7) 
**.0006 
(2.3) 
***-.27 
(-9.3) 
-.007 
(-1.17) 
SFT **.00015 
(2.1) 
***.1 
(3.9) 
***.008 
(6.1) 
*.00009 
(1.6) 
***.09 
(6.9) 
***.004 
(2.9) 
LOG(PGDP) *-.00003 
(-1.6) 
***.03 
(3.6) 
-.0007 
(-.68) 
-.00002 
(-.92) 
***.03 
(13.1) 
.0003 
(-.53) 
CORR(CPI) .00008 
(2.3) 
-.002 
(-.76) 
***-.001 
(-3.4) 
   
CORR(CCI)    **-.0001 
(-2.07) 
-.02 
(-1.09) 
**.002 
(2.1) 
IN -.00001 
(-.91) 
.0007 
(.95) 
***.001 
(26.9) 
-.00001 
(-.92) 
.001 
(1.32) 
***.001 
(14.07) 
 
***.018 
(13.3) 
  ***.18 
(14.1) 
  
 
 ***.28 
(3.3) 
  ***.27 
(2.9) 
 
 
  .11 
(1.23) 
  **.012 
(2.28) 
CORR(CPI)*DUM -.00001 
(-1.1) 
.00005 
(.003) 
*-.009 
(-1.9) 
   
CORR(CCI)*DUM    .0002 
(.76) 
-.46 
(-1.6) 
***.26 
(-3.7) 
 
.37 .94 .97 .36 .96 .97 
 
.31 .92 .96 .3 .94 .96 
D.W 1.89 2 2 1.89 1.92 1.87 
Ftest1 1.91 4.5 7.1 1.99 4.4 1.87 
Htest2 6.53 55.2 33.05 6.85 59.5 31.5 
Htest result R.E.3 F.E.4 F.E. R.E. F.E. F.E. 
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Source: Researcher calculations using Eviews 6. 
*, **&*** respectively significant in 10 ,5 &1  level. 
 
The numbers in the parentheses show t-statistic. 
  
                                                             
1-Redundant Fixed Effect Test 
2-Correlated Random Effects-Hausman Test 
3-Random Effect 
4-Fixed Effect 
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According to equation 1, Friedman inflation tax definition and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) have been 
applied. Based on regression results in this column, the estimated parameters coefficient of CORR in equation 
1 is positive and significant. The coefficient of the ratio of foreign trade to GDP (SFT), is positive and 
significant. GDP per capita (PGDP) is negative and significant. The coefficient of inflation (IN) is negative and 
it is not significant. The coefficient of the ratio of inflation tax with a lag  is positive and significant. 
The coefficient of Dummy variable is negative but it is not significant. To understand the difference between 
Iran’s performance and the average of other countries, we have to plus the coefficient of Dummy variable 
with the coefficient of corruption index. If the result is near the coefficient of corruption index, means that any 
difference cannot be seen between Iran’s performances in comparison with other countries; and if the result 
is far from the coefficient of corruption index, means that a significant difference between Iran’s performance 
and other countries can be seen. For this respect, the result shows that the relationship between corruption 
and inflation tax, in Iran, would not have a significant difference in comparison with the average of other 
countries. 
 
According to equation 2, International Bank inflation tax definition and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
have been applied. Based on regression results in this column, the estimated parameters coefficient of 
Corruption (CORR) in equation 2 is negative but it is not significant. The coefficient of the ratio of foreign 
trade to GDP (SFT), is positive and significant. GDP per capita (PGDP) is positive and significant. The 
coefficient of inflation (IN) is positive but it is not significant. The coefficient of the ratio of inflation tax with a 
lag  is positive and significant. According to the coefficient of Dummy variable and the coefficient of 
corruption index, the relationship between corruption and inflation tax, in Iran, would not have a significant 
difference in comparison with the average with the average of other countries; but, the increase in corruption 
contributed to decrease in inflation tax. According to equation 3, Vitotanzi inflation tax definition and 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) have been applied. Based on regression results in this column, the 
estimated parameters coefficient of Corruption (CORR) in equation 3 is negative and significant. The 
coefficient of the ratio of foreign trade to GDP (SFT), is positive and significant. GDP per capita (PGDP) is 
negative and it is not significant. The coefficient of inflation (IN) is positive and significant. The coefficient of 
the ratio of inflation tax with a lag  is positive but it is not significant. According to the coefficient of 
Dummy variable and the coefficient of corruption index, the relationship between corruption and inflation 
tax, in Iran, would not have a significant difference in comparison with the average of other countries; but, the 
increase in corruption contributed to decrease in inflation tax. 
 
According to equation 4, Friedman inflation tax definition and Control of Corruption Index (CCI) have been 
applied. Based on regression results in this column, the estimated parameters coefficient of Corruption 
(CORR) in equation 4 is negative and significant, so the more increase at controlling of the corruption in a 
country, will contribute to less inflation tax. The coefficient of the ratio of foreign trade to GDP (SFT), is 
positive and significant. GDP per capita (PGDP) is negative and it is not significant. The coefficient of inflation 
(IN) is negative and it is not significant. The coefficient of the ratio of inflation tax with a lag  is 
positive and significant. According to the coefficient of Dummy variable and the coefficient of corruption 
index, the relationship between corruption and inflation tax, in Iran, would not have a significant difference in 
comparison with the average of other countries. According to equation 5, International Bank inflation tax 
definition and Control of Corruption Index (CCI) have been applied. Based on regression results in this 
column, the estimated parameters coefficient of Corruption (CORR) in equation 5 is negative but it is not 
significant. The coefficient of the ratio of foreign trade to GDP (SFT), is positive and significant. GDP per capita 
(PGDP) is positive and significant. The coefficient of inflation (IN) is positive but it is not significant. The 
coefficient of the ratio of inflation tax with a lag  is positive and significant. According to the 
coefficient of Dummy variable and the coefficient of corruption index, the relationship between corruption 
and inflation tax, in Iran, would have a significant difference in comparison with the average of other 
countries. 
 
 According to equation 6, Vitotanzi inflation tax definition and Control of Corruption Index (CCI) have been 
applied. Based on regression results in this column, the estimated parameters coefficient of Corruption 
(CORR) in equation 6 is positive and significant. The coefficient of the ratio of foreign trade to GDP (SFT) is 
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positive and significant. GDP per capita (PGDP) is negative and it is not significant. The coefficient of inflation 
(IN) is positive and significant. The coefficient of the ratio of inflation tax with a lag  is positive and 
significant. According to the coefficient of Dummy variable and the coefficient of corruption index, the 
relationship between corruption and inflation tax, in Iran, would have a significant difference in comparison 
with the average of other countries. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Corruption can be effective in creation of inflation tax through budget deficit. The results show that, in MENA 
countries, the more increase at corruption will lead to more inflation tax and also the more control of 
corruption will contribute to less inflation tax. So a positive and significant relationship between corruption 
and inflation tax, in general, have been existed in the countries under consideration. Accordingly to our 
results, in some cases, a negative relationship between corruption and inflation tax have been seen; that is 
because of the increasing in government expenditures, especially non-productive government expenditures, 
and insufficient tax revenues to finance them. In addition, the effectiveness of inflation tax from Control of 
Corruption Index is more than Corruption Perception Index. Also, corruption is sensitive to different 
definition of inflation tax. As a consequence, more investigation over different period and more countries 
have been suggested. 
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